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that the development of the jurisdiction of the Consedil d'Etat in France and of
similar specialized courts in other European countries is to some extent the
result of historical accident rather than of preconceived plans. It would be in-
correct, however, to oppose creation of administrative courts on the ground
that as a rule they are more subservient to the administration than courts of
general jurisdiction. The contrary is often true, at least in Europe. Being more
familiar with the administrative machinery and its shortcomings, judges of
administrative tribunals are less inclined than other judges to be awed by the
prestige of the government.
These criticisms of Professor Street's book are matters of opinion, and in
any event are minor ones. They cannot detract from the great value of his
work. The book deals effectively with some of the more difficult problems of
administrative law. It is clear, concise and convincing. It conclusively shows
that a careful and intelligent analysis of the provisions of foreign legal systems
may be of considerable assistance in improving corresponding provisions of
domestic law. This is comparative law at it best.
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INTERSTATE COOPERATIOX: A STUDY OF THE INTERSTATE Co iPAcT. By
Vincent V. Thursby. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1953.
Pp. vi, 150. $3.25.
Tis modest volume concerns itself with the "Compact Clause of the Con-
stitution in public law."' Works in this field of compact endeavor have been
rather few. 2 This book, therefore, is a welcome addition.
In contrast with discussions of the compact device which have tended to
discount if not discourage its practice, Mr. Thursby's account might properly
be viewed as lending some encouragement to the use of compacts. Generally,
however, his work contemplates the field and renders a status report; those
in search of a method to deal with a particular problem of interstate coopera-
tion must still decide whether or not their problem can best be solved through
compacting.
The Founding Fathers, in a negative way, included in the Constitution
the authority to compact. Subsection 3, Section 10, Article I of that document
provides: "No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . enter into
any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power ......
This bare authorization, or perhaps more properly recognition, of compacts
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is all the legislation there is. The Constitution provided no prucedure nor
has any statute attempted to prescribe any guideposts.
The problems of recognizing areas lending themselves to compact, and of
forging procedures to permit the ultimate realization of a compact have only
recently received adequate attention. But what was once a little known, or
at best a relatively unused, device has within the past thirty years out-
stripped the unusual. Prior to 1920 states had entered into some thirty-four
compacts.' In the main, these involved only two states compacting in settle-
ment of a boundary dispute. Since 1920 more than twice that number of
compacts have been negotiated and ratified, and more are in the making. Now
it is not unusual for six or more states having a common problem to enter into
a compact. One effort-a reciprocal program for supervising parolees and
probationers-has all forty-eight states as signatories. And crime control is
not the only field which has taken its place with boundary disputes as subject
matter for compacts. Compacts of the Twentieth Century have lent themselves
to the reinforcement of uniform state laws. The contract obligation of a com-
pact assures one state that another will not unilaterally destroy the benefits of
uniform legislation on conservation and use of natural resources, such as fish
and marine life, oil, and forests ; on apportionment of waters of interstate streams
for reclamation and other uses, and the related problem of pollution control:
on control and improvement of navigation: on communications and utilities,
such as bridges, tunnels and waterworks; on regional education; and most
recently, on civil defense.
Mr. Thursby notes that the possibilities of resorting to the compact clause
are apparently "unlimited."-4 Among fields he suggests for its application
are interstate transportation (motor trucks and air traffic) ; child labor; the
standardization of commodities, taxes (such as those on corporations, income.
inheritance, gasoline, and liquor), and legislation (such as divorce laws):
and the institution of programs for relief, public works, social security, un-
employment insurance, drought and flood control, pest eradication, timber
and game preservation, migratory farm labor, and the administration of un-
employment compensation in our fluid labor market. The reader will recog-
nize that federal action has been taken in some of these fields, and that agencies
such as the Federal Power Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion and the Civil Aeronautics Board, have authority and responsibility in
others. Some discussion by the author of the conflict of overlapping areas
in supra-state, sub-national problems would have increased the worth of his
book.
What states may or may not compact about is usually a matter for Congress,
because the Constitution admonishes that a state shall not enter into any
agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power without
congressional assent. Mr. Thursby notes that the Constitution, in addition,
absolutely prohibits states from entering into any treaty, alliance, or con-
federation, and speculates how an "agreement or compact" may be distin-
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guished from this prohibited category. He concludes that if the document is
"political" in nature it might be categorized as a "treaty, alliance or con-
federation" and thus subject to the constitutional ban. Mr. Thursby also finds
that certain compacts or agreements may not need the consent of Congress at
all. In making a determination here, "political" once again appears crucial.
If the proposal is "minor" or "local," that is, not "tending to the increase of
political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the
just supremacy of the United States,"0' then it may not require congressional
approval. For example, if in connection with a boundary dispute, states enter
into formal bilateral or multilateral arrangements containing stipulations
affecting the conduct or claims of the parties, it would appear that such ar-
rangements would require congressional assent, express or implied, unless
no important or valuable territory changes hands-territory which if trans-
ferred would alter the political potency of the parties.
Experience indicates that placing an interstate agreement before Congress
entails little risk of rejection.6 This procedure will obviate a possible future
embarrassment of having a compact declared invalid for want of congressional
assent required by the Constitution. If it is not submitted to Congress and its
validity on that score is subsequently attacked, then one can only argue that
it is not a "compact or agreement." If it is not either of these, and bearing
in mind that States may not enter into treaties, alliances or confederations,
even with congressional assent, then what label can one affix? Since they
cannot count on labels, states would appear best advised to submit their formal
"arrangements" to Congress.
The procedures by which compacts are evolved are left to the sponsors.
The only guide is precedent, and it shows two chief methods of compacting.
The first is by legislation enacted by one state which constitutes an offer to
one or more other states to enact the same law. This method contemplates
a later exchange of formal ratifications, and a submittal of the matter to Con-
gress. The second method involves congressional authorization to negotiate
as a first step, following which a federal representative is appointed to meet
with state commissioners appointed by the respective states. Their work is
then submitted to the state legislatures for ratification and, finally, to Congress.
Authorization by the Congress to negotiate may not be essential, nor is the
participation of a federal representative, but both features probably make
the path of ultimate congressional consent an easier one. To encourage region-
al action, Congress has given blanket approval in advance to compacts relating
to the control of crime, flood control, forest conservation, and tobacco pro-
duction. Policywise, the matter of prior consent has been attacked; one such
5. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
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effort by Congress in 1939 to authorize compacts among Atlantic Coast
States with respect to fishing, without reserving to itself final approval, was
vetoed.7
Congressional action notwithstanding, Mr. Thursby's research indicates
little doubt that the federal courts may pass judgment on the meaning and
validity of a compact. Original suits between states are of course exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. If states are nut litigants, the
authorities cited by the author" show that the compact, if not becoming a
matter of federal law by virtue of e-xpress congressional assent, may involve
a federal "title, right, privilege or immunity"; or may contain a question under
the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts; or bring
in issue the rights of other states and the United States-all of which may
qualif3, to put the matter eventually before the Supreme Court. With respect
to lower courts, Mr. Thursby feels that removal to federal courts may be had
on the ground that a state court, as an instrumentality of a compacting state.
could be said to have an interest in the outcome of compact litigation sufficient
to disqualify it. It would be interesting to see a test of this last conclusion.
As there are no rules as to how compacts shall be made, so there are no
rules as to what they must contain. The author finds that several elements
are commonly included: the legal basis of the compact, statement of purposes,
goals sought to be achieved, the obligations assumed, definitions of terms.
possibly a mode for alteration, and the method of termination or a termination
date. Some compacts create supervisory commissions, e.g., the Port of New
York Authority. If a commission is not established, provision may be made
for the settlement of disputes arising out of the compact. Mr. Thursby main-
tains that "[f]ailure to provide some means for development, revision, and
continuing adjustment may well mean that the compact contains the seeds of
its own destruction."9
Failure to make provision for adjustment, and the fact that state legislatures
have been wary about compacting away a review by them of compact changes,
have led some commentators to charge that the compact device, as the solution
for any problem or dispute which cannot be settled "once and for all," is inflex-
ible and therefore undesirable. The author feels that this obstacle can be sur-
mounted by a provision for a termination or revision date.10 But he tends to
agree that the compact device "should be confined to appropriate subject
matter" inasmuch as it "has proved unsatisfactory as a medium for continuous
and progressive planning activity."'1  Compact negotiation may be a "slow
and cumbersome process at best," ' and local political overtones may operate
to make the forging of a workable compact difficult. On the other hand, as
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continuing and flexible adjustment. Further imaginative developments in
this area can be expected.
One should also realize that modern supra-state, sub-national problems
are somewhat more involved than the old boundary disputes. Study, debate,
and passage of time can be expected in the hammering out of an effective agree-
ment which will serve the best interests of all concerned.
Mr. Thursby states that "the United States may become a party to a com-
pact with one or more of its member States. '14 Although there may be little
available information on this point, present or future compact participants
would undoubtedly like to see some informed speculation on the rights and
duties of the United States as a party, and on the question of compact enforce-
ment as against the Federal Government. Mr. Thursby shows that states may
not unilaterally impair the contractual obligation of a compact by executive
or legislative action. But, could Congress "reverse" an unfavorable court
ruling by legislating the destruction of a compact to which the United States
was a party?
This reviewer hopes for continued scholarly inquiry into the compact field,
such as that conducted by Mr. Thursby. Certainly the compact device is no
panacea, but it is definitely established as a vehicle of state cooperation which
has the desirable attributes of lasting quality and federal blessing. It gives
states having common problems the opportunity to combine to resolve them,
either once and for all or under the direction of an agency established by the
states. As the confidence of states grows with their ability to solve their prob-
lems by compact, so will the number and the ingenuity of the compacts they
produce.
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THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SEcURITY PROGRAM. By Eleanor Bontecou. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1953. Pp. xi, 377. $5.00.
UNDER the auspices of a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to Cornell
University, Miss Eleanor Bontecou has written an exhaustive study of the
entire Federal Government's Loyalty-Security Program. I introduce her
book in these words, since, in a way, they seem to give an apt idea of
its content; and in conjunction with Miss Bontecou's own commendably
frank statement that her study is not, and could not be an unbiased one,
they also strike the keynote of her presentation.
Primarily, and in its best expression, the book is documentary. With
meticulous and almost unerring accuracy, it traces the genesis, development,
mechanism, purposes, and prognosticated results of the Program. It is replete
with appendices, footnote references to court decisions as well as to Loyalty
Board cases, articles, speeches, congressional reports, and most other avail-
able sources of information. The book traces the development of the program
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